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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA 
 
CASE NO. 20-60702-CIV-SINGHAL 
 






KIK INTERACTIVE, INC., a Canadian corporation,  







 THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DE [24]).  
Plaintiff, a minor proceeding pseudonymously, has filed a Complaint (DE [1]) seeking 
damages from Defendants, Kik Interactive, Inc. and Medialab AI Inc.1 under the 
Trafficking Victims Protections Act (“TVPA”), 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).  Defendants moved to 
dismiss arguing they are immune from suit or alternatively, that Plaintiff has failed to state 
a claim upon which relief can be granted.  Plaintiff has filed a memorandum in opposition 
(DE [29]) and Defendant has filed its reply memorandum (DE [33]).  For the reasons set 
forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DE [24]) is granted. 
I. BACKGROUND 
Defendants own and operate a web-based interactive service known as Kik 
Interactive or “Kik.”  According to Plaintiff, Kik is marketed to teenagers and young adults 
for purposes of sending messages to other users. (Compl. ¶ 25-26). The Complaint 
                                            
1 MediaLabs, Inc. acquired Kik Interactive on or around October 29, 2019 and is the current owner-operator 
of the Kik Interactive service. 
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alleges multiple instances where adult users of Kik have used the service to contact and 
solicit sexual activity with minors, with some of those contacts resulting in death of the 
minors. (Compl. ¶ 15-23).  Plaintiff alleges that Defendants have knowledge that sexual 
predators use its service to prey on minors but have failed to provide any warnings or 
enact policies to protect minors from such abuses. (Compl. ¶ 45). 
Plaintiff alleges that in July 2019 numerous adult male users of Kik (“Identified Kik 
Users”) solicited her and convinced her to take and send them sexually graphic pictures 
of herself using Kik. (Compl. ¶ 15-23).  She also alleges these adult males sent her 
sexually explicit photographs via Kik.2 (Id.)  Her father found the photographs on her 
cellphone and computer tablet and reported the incidents to the police. (Id.).  The 
cellphone and tablet were turned over to the Florida Department of Law Enforcement.  
(Id.).   
Plaintiff filed suit under the civil remedy statute, Trafficking Victims Protection Act, 
18 U.S.C. § 1595.  She alleges that Defendants are liable for damages for knowingly 
“participat[ing] in IDENTIFIED KIK USERS’ venture in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1591 by 
benefiting from, and knowingly facilitating (by not implementing policies sufficient to 
combat a known problem), the venture in which IDENTIFIED KIK USERS used Kik 
Messenger in the interstate commerce to subject Jane Doe to sex trafficking.” (Compl. 
¶ 42).  She also alleges Defendants “knew, or were in reckless disregard of the facts, that 
it was the practice of IDENTIFIED KIK USERS to utilize Kik Messenger to furnish harmful 
materials such as pictures of men’s genitalia to Jane Doe and subject Jane Doe to sex 
trafficking . . . [but] continued to market Kik Messenger to underage users without a 
                                            
2 For purposes of this motion the parties did not dispute that this conduct falls under the federal definition 
of “sex trafficking.” 
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sufficient warning and implementation of sufficient polices to protect the underage users 
of Kik Messenger.” (Compl. ¶ 43, 44). 
Defendants move to dismiss on two grounds.  First, they argue immunity from suit 
pursuant to the Computer Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230(a); second, for failure 
to state a claim under 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).   
II. LEGAL STANDARDS 
A. Motion to Dismiss Standards.  
 At the pleading stage, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing the [plaintiff] is entitled to relief.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a).  Although Rule 8(a) 
does not require “detailed factual allegations,” it does require “more than labels and 
conclusions”; a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.”  Bell 
Atl. Corp v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).  To survive a motion to dismiss, “factual 
allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and must 
be sufficient “to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face.”  Id. at 555.  “A claim 
has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw 
the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft 
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).  “The mere possibility the defendant acted unlawfully 
is insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss.”  Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 
1252, 1261 (11th Cir. 2009), abrogated on other grounds by Mohamad v. Palestinian 
Auth., 556 U.S. 449 (2012). 
In considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court=s review is generally 
“limited to the four corners of the complaint.”  Wilchombe v. TeeVee Toons, Inc., 555 F.3d 
949, 959 (11th Cir. 2009) (quoting St. George v. Pinellas Cty., 285 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th 
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Cir. 2002)).  In reviewing the complaint, the court must do so in the light most favorable 
to the plaintiff, and it must generally accept the plaintiff=s well-pleaded facts as true.  See 
Hishon v. King & Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984); Am. United Life Ins. Co. v. Martinez, 
480 F.3d 1043, 1057 (11th Cir. 2007).  But “[c]onclusory allegations, unwarranted 
deductions of facts or legal conclusions masquerading as facts will not prevent dismissal.”  
Jackson v. Bellsouth Telecommunications, 372 F.3d 1250, 1262 (11th Cir. 2004) (citation 
omitted); see also Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 (“[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true 
all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions“).   
B. Immunity Under the Communications Decency Act 
 Defendants argue that they are immune from suit under the Communications 
Decency Act (“CDA”), 47 U.S.C. § 230.  Section 230, entitled “Protection for private 
blocking and screening of offensive material,” begins with a list of “Findings” and “Policy”: 
(a) Findings 
 
The Congress finds the following: 
 
(1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive 
computer services available to individual Americans represent an 
extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and 
informational resources to our citizens. 
 
(2) These services offer users a great deal of control over the 
information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater 
control in the future as technology develops. 
 
(3) The internet and other interactive computer services offer a forum for 
a true diversity of public discourse, unique opportunities for cultural 
development, and myriad avenues for intellectual activity. 
 
(4) The Internet and other interactive computer services have flourished, 
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(5) ncreasingly Americans are relying on interactive media for a variety of 




It is the policy of the United States – 
 
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet and other 
interactive computer services and other interactive media; 
 
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists 
for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by 
Federal or State regulation; 
 
(3) to encourage the development of technologies which maximize user 
control over what information is received by individuals, families, and 
schools who use the Internet and other interactive computer services; 
 
(4) to remove disincentives for the development and utilization of blocking 
and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their 
children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material; and 
 
(5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal criminal laws to deter and 
punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking, and harassment by means of 
computer. 
 
47 U.S.C. § 230(a) and (b).  In recognition of those stated findings and policies, 
subsection (c) of the CDA provides that “[n]o provider ... of an interactive computer service 
shall be treated as a publisher or speaker of any information provided by another 
information content provider.”  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  This is the immunity provision relied 
upon by Defendants.  In addition to granting immunity to interactive service providers for 
content created by third parties, Congress also expressly preempted all state laws that 
are inconsistent with this immunity. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3) (“No cause of action may be 
brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent 
with this section.”).   
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C. FOSTA Exception to Immunity 
 In 2018, Congress enacted the Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act (“FOSTA”) and 
removed sex trafficking from CDA immunity.  FOSTA provides that “[n]othing in this 
section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair or limit . . . any claim 
in a civil action under section 1595 of Title 18, if the conduct underlying the claim 
constitutes a violation of section 1591 of that title.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A).  This is the 
provision relied upon by Plaintiff. 
D. Sex Trafficking Claims Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1591, 1595 
 FOSTA permits claims for civil damages to be made against interactive computer 
service providers under § 1595, if “the conduct underlying the claim constitutes a violation 
of section 1591.” Section 1595 is the Civil Remedy provision of the Trafficking Victims 
Protection Act and provides as follows:   
An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may 
bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever 
knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value 
from participation in a venture which that person knew or 
should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this 
chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States 
and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).  Section 1591(a) criminalizes certain conduct: 
 
(a) Whoever knowingly – 
 
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce . . . recruits, 
entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, 
advertises, maintains, patronizes, or solicits by any 
means a person; or 
  




(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, 
from participation in a venture which has engaged in an 
act described in violation of paragraph (1), 
 
knowing, or except where the act constituting the violation 
of paragraph (1) is advertising, in reckless disregard of the 
fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion 
described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such 
means will be used to cause the person to engage in a 
commercial sex act, or that the person has not attained the 
age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a 
commercial sex act, will be punished as provided in 
subsection (b). 
 
18 U.S.C. § 1591(a).  “The term ‘participation in a venture’ means knowingly assisting, 
supporting, or facilitating a violation of subsection (a)(1).”  18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(4).3 
III. MOTION TO DISMISS  
 Defendants move to dismiss the Complaint arguing they are entitled to immunity 
under the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).  The primary purpose of the CDA “was to protect 
children from sexually explicit internet content.” FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 
158, 173 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing 141 Cong. Rec. S1953 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1995) (statement 
of Sen. Exon)). “Section 230, though – added as an amendment to the CDA bill – was 
enacted to maintain the robust nature of Internet communication and, accordingly, to keep 
government interference in the medium to a minimum.” Force v. Facebook, Inc., 934 F.3d 
53, 63 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 206 L. Ed. 2d 936 (May 18, 2020) (quotations omitted).  
“Indeed, Congress stated in Section 230 that ‘[i]t is the policy of the United States – (1) to 
promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer 
services and other interactive media; [and] (2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive 
                                            
3 The phrase “participation in a venture” is not defined in 18 U.S.C. § 1595. 
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free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, 
unfettered by Federal or State regulation.’” Id. (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(1)-(2)).  
“Congress made a policy choice . . . not to deter harmful online speech through the 
separate route of imposing tort liability on companies that serve as intermediaries for 
other parties' potentially injurious messages.”  Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 
330–31 (4th Cir. 1997). The Zeran court succinctly explained the reasons behind the 
Congressional policy decision: 
Congress' purpose in providing the § 230 immunity was thus 
evident. Interactive computer services have millions of users. See 
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. [884], __, 117 S. Ct. at 2334 (noting that 
at time of district court trial, “commercial online services had 
almost 12 million individual subscribers”). The amount of 
information communicated via interactive computer services is 
therefore staggering. The specter of tort liability in an area of such 
prolific speech would have an obvious chilling effect. It would be 
impossible for service providers to screen each of their millions 
of postings for possible problems. Faced with potential liability for 
each message republished by their services, interactive 
computer service providers might choose to severely restrict the 
number and type of messages posted. Congress considered the 
weight of the speech interests implicated and chose to immunize 
service providers to avoid any such restrictive effect. 
 
Id. at 331. 
 “There are three elements to a claim of immunity under Section 230(c). The 
defendant must show that: “(1) [it] ‘is a provider . . . of an interactive computer service, (2) 
the claim is based on information provided by another information content provider and 
(3) the claim would treat the defendant as the publisher or speaker of that information.’” 
Herrick v. Grindr, LLC, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579, 588 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), aff'd, 765 Fed. Appx. 
586 (2d Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 140 S. Ct. 221 (2019) (quoting LeadClick Media, LLC, 
838 F.3d at 173 (additional citations omitted)).  “The majority of federal circuits have 
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interpreted the CDA to establish broad ‘federal immunity to any cause of action that would 
make service providers liable for information originating with a third-party user of the 
service.’” Almeida v. Amazon.com, Inc., 456 F.3d 1316, 1321 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting 
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330. 
 Numerous courts have recognized CDA immunity in claims made against 
providers of interactive computer services arising from content produced by their users.  
For instance, a defamation claim against Google based upon posts made by a third-party 
user was dismissed due to immunity under the CDA. Shuler v. Duke, 2018 WL 2445685, 
at *10 (N.D. Ala. May 31, 2018), aff'd, 792 Fed. Appx. 697 (11th Cir. 2019).    See also 
Mezey v. Twitter, Inc., 2018 WL 5306769 (S.D. Fla. Jul. 19, 2018) (CDA barred claim that 
defendant unlawfully suspended his Twitter account); Herrick, 306 F. Supp. 3d 579 (CDA 
barred claims against Grndr that arose from publication of an account that impersonated 
plaintiff); McMillan v. Amazon.com, Inc., 433 F. Supp.3d 1034, 1045 (S.D. Tex. 2020) 
(CDA barred negligence action against Amazon arising from a failure to warn of dangers 
of a product sold on its site).  “In general, this section protects websites from liability for 
material posted on the website by someone else.”  Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 
846, 850 (9th Cir. 2016).  If not for the nature of Plaintiff’s claims in this case, Defendants 
would satisfy the elements for CDA immunity:  they are an interactive computer service 
provider,4 the claim is based upon information provided by another, and the claim would 
treat Defendants as though they published and solicited the photographs in question.   
Plaintiff denies that her claims treat Defendants as though they were merely 
publishers of the explicit photographs and videos.  She asserts that her claim is that 
                                            
4 The parties do not dispute that Defendants are an “interactive computer service provider.” 
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Defendants violated 18 U.S.C. § 1591 by failing to enact policies that would have 
prevented her from being trafficked by fellow Kik users. But this is exactly the type of claim 
that CDA immunity bars.  See Doe v. MySpace, Inc., 528 F.3d 413, 420 (5th Cir. 2008) 
(MySpace immune under CDA from a claim that it failed to protect a user from sexual 
predators).  Although the MySpace decision pre-dated FOSTA, it is clear that FOSTA 
does not subject interactive computer service providers to liability for any cause of action 
that might otherwise be available under common law.  Rather, FOSTA removes CDA 
immunity only for claims “under section 1595 of Title 18, if the conduct underlying the 
claim constitutes a violation of section 1591 of that title.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A).  Had 
Congress intended to revoke CDA immunity for all claims involving sex trafficking on 
websites (as argued by Plaintiff), it could have done so; but it did not.  The plain language 
of the statute removes immunity only for conduct that violates 18 U.S.C § 1591. 
The parties dispute the level of mens rea a defendant must possess for a claim 
under FOSTA to overcome CDA immunity.  The confusion arises from the phrase 
“participation in a venture” in both § 1591 (the criminal statute) and § 1595(a) (the civil 
remedy statute).  The criminal statute defines “participation in a venture” as “knowingly 
assisting, supporting, or facilitating a violation of subsection (a)(1).”  18 U.S.C. 1591(e)(4).  
The civil remedy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1595, does not define “participation in a venture.”  
Defendants argue that to defeat CDA immunity the § 1591(e)(4) definition applies and 
Plaintiff must – but has failed to -- show that Defendants benefitted from participation in 
a venture that knowingly assisted, supported, or facilitated Plaintiff being trafficked. See 
United States v. Afyare, 632 Fed. Appx. 272, 286 (6th Cir. 2016) (liability under § 1591 
requires active participation in trafficking venture).   
Case 0:20-cv-60702-AHS   Document 34   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2020   Page 10 of 16
11 
 
Plaintiff argues that “participation in a venture” as used in § 1595(a) does not 
incorporate the definition contained in § 1591(e)(4) and to do so would render superfluous 
the language “knew or should have known” contained in § 1595(a).  Plaintiff argues that 
for liability under § 1595(a) to exist she need only show that Defendants “knew or should 
have known” that it was participating in a venture that was engaged in sex trafficking in 
violation of § 1591.  She cites other known instances of sexual predators utilizing Kik to 
establish that Defendants knew or should have known of the possibility that she would be 
subjected to trafficking. (Compl. ¶¶ 15-23). 
If Defendants were not interactive computer service providers, Plaintiff’s argument 
might prevail.  A recent decision from the Middle District of Florida identified the elements 
of a civil claim under § 1595(a).  S.Y. v. Naples Hotel Co., 2020 WL 4504976, at *2 (M.D. 
Fla. Aug. 5, 2020).  The court conducted a thorough review of cases involving claimed 
liability under § 1595(a) and found that the majority of “courts determined that [§] 1595 
includes a constructive knowledge element, and that applying the definition of 
‘participation in a venture’ provided for in § 1591(e) to the requirements under § 1595 
would void the ‘known or should have known’ language of § 1595.”  Id. (citing M.A. v. 
Wyndham Hotels & Resorts, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 3d 959, 969 (S.D. Ohio 2019); J.C. v. 
Choice Hotels Int’l Inc., 2020 WL 3035794, *1 n.1 (N.D. Cal. Jun. 5, 2020); A.B. v. Marriott 
Int’l Inc., 2020 WL 1939678, *13 (E.D. Pa. Apr. 22, 2020); Doe S.W. v. Lorain-Elyria Motel, 
Inc., 2020 WL 1244192, *6 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 16, 2020); H.H. v. G6 Hosp., LLC, 2019 WL 
6682152, *4 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 6, 2019)).  Because § 1595(a) requires that a defendant 
“knew or should have known” that it was benefitting from or participating in a trafficking 
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venture, the “negligence standard of constructive knowledge” applies.  H.H., 2019 WL 
6682152, at *1.5  
The S.Y. case and the cases cited above all involved hotel defendants who were 
alleged to have constructive knowledge that the plaintiffs were being trafficked on their 
properties.  Significantly, because the hotel defendants were not interactive computer 
service providers, neither FOSTA nor CDA immunity were considered.  The present case 
presents a different scenario, because Congress – in balancing the needs of protecting 
children and encouraging “robust Internet communication” – enacted a statute protecting 
interactive computer service providers from liability for their users’ content and conduct.  
If it were not for FOSTA, Defendants in this case would be completely immune from 
liability under the CDA.  47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(5); MySpace, 528 F.3d 413. 
To resolve Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, this Court must consider the extent to 
which FOSTA has affected the immunity provided by the CDA.  Again, FOSTA states that 
““[n]othing in this section (other than subsection (c)(2)(A)) shall be construed to impair or 
limit . . . any claim in a civil action under section 1595 of Title 18, if the conduct underlying 
the claim constitutes a violation of section 1591 of that title.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(5)(A) 
(emphasis added).  Plaintiff argues that as a result of FOSTA, “the exacting standard of 
‘actual knowledge’ and ‘overt act’ employed in a criminal prosecution under § 1591 is 
replaced by [a] ‘constructive knowledge’ standard when a civil recovery is sought under 
the TVPA.”  (DE [29], p. 21).  But this argument would have the Court disregard the plain 
                                            
5 The Court notes that Plaintiff does not allege any facts that would plausibly establish Defendants knew or 
should have known about her particular situation or that the Identified Kik Users were using Kik for sex 
trafficking.  Plaintiff’s allegations that Defendants knew of the Identified Kik User’s practice of using Kik to 
furnish harmful, sexually explicit photographs (Compl. ¶ 43, 44) are conclusory and lack factual support. 
Jackson, 372 F.3d at 1262 (conclusions and unwarranted deductions of fact will not prevent dismissal). 
Case 0:20-cv-60702-AHS   Document 34   Entered on FLSD Docket 08/31/2020   Page 12 of 16
13 
 
language and structure of FOSTA.  “A statute should be interpreted so that no words shall 
be discarded as meaningless, redundant, or mere surplusage.”  United States v. DBB, 
Inc., 180 F.3d 1277, 1285 (11th Cir. 1999) (quotation omitted).    
Defendants argue that the Congressional history of FOSTA6 shows that Congress 
only intended to create a narrow exception to the CDA for “openly malicious actors such 
as Backpage where it was plausible for a plaintiff to allege actual knowledge and overt 
participation.”  (DE [33], p. 5) and that a finding of actual knowledge and overt participation 
in a venture of sexual trafficking is required to defeat CDA immunity.  This is consistent 
with the language of FOSTA.  By its terms, FOSTA did not abrogate CDA immunity for all 
claims arising from sex trafficking; FOSTA permits civil liability for websites only “if the 
conduct underlying the claim constitutes a violation of section 1591.”  And section 1591 
requires knowing and active participation in sex trafficking by the defendants.  Afyare, 
632 Fed. Appx. at 286;  see also Geiss v. Weinstein Co. Holdings, LLC, 383 F. Supp. 3d 
156, 169 (S.D.N.Y 2019) (“aiders and abettors of sex trafficking are liable under the TVPA 
only if they knowingly ‘benefit[ ], financially or by receiving anything of value from 
participating in a venture which has engaged in’ sex trafficking”) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 
1591(a)); Noble v. Weinstein, 335 F. Supp. 3d 504, 524 (S.D. NY 2018) (“Plaintiff must 
allege specific conduct that furthered the sex trafficking venture. Such conduct must have 
been undertaken with the knowledge, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that it was 
furthering the alleged sex trafficking venture. In other words, some participation in the sex 
trafficking act itself must be shown.”). 
                                            
6 See 164 Cong. Rec., at S1860-62 (“[FOSTA] is a narrowly crafted bill that would ensure that Section 230 
of the Communications Decency Act does not provide legal immunity to websites like Backpage that 
knowingly facilitate sex trafficking.”); H.R. Rep. No 115-572, at 5 (“general knowledge that sex trafficking 
occurs on a website will not suffice as the knowledge element must be proven as to a specific victim”). 
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Plaintiff has not alleged facts that would plausibly establish that Defendants 
knowingly participated in the sex trafficking venture involving her; she alleges that 
Defendants knew that other sex trafficking incidents occurred on Kik.  This does not 
satisfy FOSTA’s requirement that the conduct underlying the claim violate 18 U.S.C. § 
1591.  For this reason, Plaintiff’s claims against Defendants are barred by the immunity 
provisions of the CDA, 47 U.S.C. § 230(e), and the Complaint, therefore, must be 
dismissed. 
IV. LEAVE TO AMEND 
Plaintiff requests leave to amend her complaint to add causes of action in 
negligence and strict liability for failure to warn about the dangers of being sexually 
exploited associated with using Kik Messenger.  This request contravenes § 230(e)(3) of 
the CDA, which preempts state law: “No cause of action may be brought and no liability 
may be imposed under any State or local law that is inconsistent with this section.”  47 
U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).  Plaintiff argues that a failure to warn claim is not barred by § 230 and 
relies upon Doe, 824 F.3d 846.  In that case, the owners of a website called Model 
Mayhem were aware of two individuals who had obtained victims’ contact information 
from Model Mayhem’s site and used the information to lure them into fake auditions where 
they were drugged and raped.  After the plaintiff suffered the same horrific fate, she sued 
the website’s owner for failure to warn under California law.  The court held that CDA 
immunity did not bar the claims, but nothing in the plaintiff’s claims involved Internet 
Brands’ actions as a publisher of content: 
Jane Doe herself posted her profile, but she does not seek to 
hold Internet Brands liable for its content. Nor does she allege 
that Flanders and Callum posted anything to the website. The 
Complaint alleges only that “JANE DOE was contacted by 
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Lavont Flanders through MODELMAYHEM.COM using a fake 
identity.” Jane Doe does not claim to have been lured by any 
posting that Internet Brands failed to remove. Internet Brands 
is also not alleged to have learned of the predators' activity 
from any monitoring of postings on the website, nor is its 
failure to monitor postings at issue. 
Instead, Jane Doe attempts to hold Internet Brands 
liable for failing to warn her about information it obtained from 
an outside source about how third parties targeted and lured 
victims through Model Mayhem. The duty to warn allegedly 
imposed by California law would not require Internet Brands 
to remove any user content or otherwise affect how it 
publishes or monitors such content. 
 
Id. at 851.  By contrast, in this case Plaintiff’s failure to warn claims are inextricably 
linked to the harmful content solicited and posted by Kik’s users.  This is precisely the 
type of claim for which Congress has determined that interactive computer website 
providers should be immune.   
Although leave to amend should be freely granted, the court may decline to grant 
leave to amend if the amendment would be futile.  Futility justifies the denial of leave to 
amend where the complaint, as amended, would still be subject to dismissal. Burger King 
Corp. v. Weaver, 169 F.3d 1310, 1320 (11th Cir.1999) (citations omitted).  Because 
Plaintiff’s proposed causes of action would be subject to dismissal, the Court will deny 
leave to file an amended complaint.  Accordingly, it is hereby 
  




ORDERED AND AJUDGED that Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (DE [24]) is 
GRANTED.  Plaintiff’s Complaint is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.  The Clerk of Court 
is directed to CLOSE this case and DENY AS MOOT any pending motions. 




Copies furnished counsel via CM/ECF 
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